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Comments / "Equal Protection" and the
Neighborhood School
An indefinable something is to be
done, in a way nobody knows how, at
a time nobody knows when, that will
accomplish nobody knows what.*
As A RESULT OF CENTURIES of savagery and slavery and over a hundred years of
simple racial prejudice, Negroes live apart from whites in most areas of most
communities in the United States. This residential segregation and the ap-
plication of a neighborhood school policy by educational authorities have re-
sulted in the majority of white and colored children attending schools popu-
lated almost exclusively by those of their own race. To this condition has been
given the name, "de facto" school segregation; the term implies an absence of
laws or affirmative attempts by authorities to keep the races separate in the
schools. Nevertheless, Negro plaintiffs, relying on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the Brown decision of 19541, have fought for the end of "de facto"
school segregation in Northern communities. Time and space prevent any de-
tailed consideration of the growing number of cases2, and the existence of ex-
cellent articles in other law journals makes it unnecessary.3 This comment is
* Thomas B. Reed, Speaker of the U. S. House of Representatives, 1889-90, 1895-99.
1 Brown vs. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Early in 1963 twenty suits had been begun challenging the neighborhood school policy in
various areas of the North. Kaplan, Segregation, Litigation and the Schools, 58 Nw. U.L.
REV. 1,157 (1963). The fullest reports on pending and threatened legal action are found in
the annual reports of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights for 1961-62-63.
0 E.g., Maslow, De Facto Public School Segregation, 6 VILL. L. REV. 353 (1961); Sedler, School
Segregation in the North and West: Legal Aspects, ST. Louis U.L. J. 228 (1962); Kaplan,
supra note 2; 9 WAYNE L. REV. 514 (1963); 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 722 (1963).
Comments
a brief study of the cogency of constitutional arguments based on the "equal
protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its historical function
as a weapon against racial discrimination.
I
It is said, of course, that the whole problem of "de facto" school segregation
is a "political" not a "legal" problem4 ; that the courts are ill-equipped to cope
with its; therefore, the proper place for it to be solved is at the polls or in the
legislatures. All this is no doubt true. The courts should not be made to deter-
mine the policy of the community in such a controversial matter. Neverthe-
less, the courts are open, and Negro plaintiffs alleging serious and arguable
constitutional deprivations are resorting to them. They have little choice but
to hear these claims and pass on their validity.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is the highest
court yet to pass directly on the claim that application of a neighborhood
school policy to segregated neighborhoods deprives minority children of the
"equal protection of the laws." 6 The decision was in favor of defendant-school
board and against the Negro plaintiffs. In so deciding, the court took its stand
with the majority of federal courts which have spoken on the problem, either
because required to do so by the case at bar or because they felt dictum on the
subject was required. The courts which have been forced to meet "de facto"
segregation head on, however, have been few in number.7 A reading of these
decisions and other segregation cases which have adverted to the problem
provides little help in finding a legal starting point from which to go at the
constitutional problem. In the main the courts have contented themselves
with conclusory statements, supported by little in the way of reasoning. For
example:
The court holds that the states do not have an affirmative, constitutional duty to
provide an integrated education .... This clause [the "equal protection" clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment] does not contemplate compelling action; rather,
it is a prohibition preventing the states from applying their laws unequally.8
In carrying out, on remand, the Supreme Court's command to integrate the
schools, the district court for the district of Kansas said:
'E.g., Moore, C. J., dissenting in Taylor v. Board of Education, 294 F. 2d 36, 40 (2d Cir.
1961).
'E.g., Kaplan, supra note 2, at 4.
'Bell v. School City of Gary, Ind., 324 F. 2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), affirming 213 F. Supp.
819 (N.D. Ind. 1963). As of early March, 1964, no cases involving this issue had been docketed
in the Supreme Court.
7 Henry v. Godsell, 165 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1958); Evans v. Buchanan, 207 F. Supp. 820
(D.Del. 1962); Branche v. Hempstead, 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); Bell v. School City of
Gary, Ind., supra note 6; Blocker v. Manhasset, 32 U.S.L. Week 2398 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1964).
' Evans v. Buchanan, supra note 7, at 823.
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If it is a fact, as we understand it is, .... that the district is inhabited entirely by
colored students, no violation of any constitutional right results because they are
compelled to attend the school in the district in which they live.9
In sum:
The Constitution, in other words, does not require integration. It merely forbids
discrimination. 10
This propensity for flat statements is the more remarkable when one begins
to realize the logic of the plaintiffs' constitutional claims, how the problem
can be made to fit the terms of the Amendment.
Accepting as true the sociological arguments that it matters not, in terms of
harm to the child, wheher school segregaion is imposed by governmental au-
thorities or arises from private residential patterns11 , one must conclude that
the existence of racially segregated schools denies the minority child an op-
portunity for an education equal to that of the child who happens to belong
to the majority race. Is the state involved in this process? More importantly,
can a legitimate causal connection be drawn between this "state action" and
the existing inequality?
Through its operation of the school system, the state (more properly, the
municipality and its agent, the school board) is obviously involved. It fixes
school boundaries, compels attendance within those boundaries, collects tax-
es to support the system as established. Moreover, it is this very fixing of the
boundaries that would be sufficient to establish a direct cause-effect relation-
ship between the government's involvement and the Negro child's unequal
treatment. But it is said that the primary cause of the separation between
dominant and minority races is private action, the individual choices of peo-
ple as to where they want to live. This is the "real" cause, and it is not such
individual action but state action which is limited by the Constitution. Such
metaphysical distinctions, however, just will not do. Suffice it to say that, with-
out the application of a neighborhood school policy by the school boards,
without the compulsion to attend the school closest to the child's home, all
the private attempts to keep the races separate in the schools would fail. In
short, without state action, private action would be ineffective. 12
Brown v. Board of Education, 139 F. Supp. 468,470 (D.Kan. 1955).
10Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776,777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
11 This contention itself has not been free from challenge. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 2,
at 174-75.
2 Some may object that, even were city-wide enrollment adopted, people would still send
their children to the school nearest home. Thus, the neighborhood school policy is not to
blame for racial separation. The first answer is that this conclusion is not quite so certain,
given the present Negro drive for closer contacts with whites. The second answer is that,
even without judicial enforcement of racial restrictive covenants, people might still effective-
ly keep Negroes out of their residential area by voluntary adherence to the covenant. Yet,
this was not enough to keep the Supreme Court from forbidding the state action inherent in
such judicial enforcement. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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In addition, the reapportionment case of Baker v. Carr13 offers a rationale
in this area. Through inaction the states have failed to overcome inequalities
in the effectiveness of their citizens' votes. Assuming the original districting
was done reasonably, to afford fairly accurate representation, shifts of popula-
tion from country to city have resulted in disproportionate power in the
hands of rural voters. This has placed upon the states the constitutional ob-
ligation to redistrict. Similarly, here, assuming the original school districting
was done reasonably, from considerations of convenience and safety, shifts of
population to the suburbs and into the ghettos now result in racial separation
in the schools. Should not the inaction of the cities and school boards call
down on them the same constitutional command to overcome this inequality?
It is difficult to avoid the logic of these positions and, therefore, difficult to
understand the rather cavalier treatment given them by the courts to which
they have been presented. The constitutional claims are at least prima facie
valid and deserve serious consideration, especially in view of what is at stake:
the adequate education of a substantial body of future citizens. Nevertheless,
traditional theories of "equal protection of the laws" seem to militate against
these arguments, and while the early segregation cases depart from the tradi-
tional path of reasoning, their deviation is not such as will aid the constitu-
tional argument against "de facto" school segregation. The next few para-
graphs will attempt to illustrate these propositions.
II
The earliest cases construing the Fourteenth Amendment agree that its dom-
inant purpose was to secure equal treatment for the recently emancipated
Negroes. 14 Even Plessy v. Ferguson'5 recognized this, but the Court there did
not believe that Congress could have meant to outlaw all segregation based on
race' 6, and upheld a Louisiana statute requiring "equal but separate" accom-
odations for whites and Negroes on railway cars and imposing fine or im-
prisonment on one who refused to occupy that part of the train reserved for
his race. Moreover, although the Supreme Court in Brown found the legisla-
tive history of the Fourteenth Amendment "inconclusive" on the question of
its application to the schools' 7 , it had no doubts concerning the Amendment's
basic, general thrust.'8
- 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
14 Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880);
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). See Kauper,
Segregation in Public Education: The Decline of Plessy v. Ferguson, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1137
(1954).
163 US. 537 (1896).18 Id. at 544.
17 Supra note 1, at 489.
'n Id. at 490. See Frank and Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of
the Laws", 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131 (1950). The authors' pre-Brown analysis of the Congres-
19641
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Recognizing the establishment of equality of races before the law as the
goal of the Fourteenth Amendment, and, in particular, the "equal protec-
tion" clause, does it require absolute equality, no matter what the costs?
Neither the historical judicial approach to the general meaning of "equal
protection" nor the earliest application of the principle to racial discrimina-
tions nor even Brown and its progeny seem to be precedents for such an ap-
proach.
Most often the "equal protection" clause has been used to judge state clas-
sifications among its citizens for the purpose of regulation. 19 Obviously, the
amendment could not be held to require only legislation applicable to all
citizens of the state; proper government regulation of health, safety and the
general order of the state must require laws applying specifically to certain
classes whose unregulated activity might cause injury to the general populace.
A ready example is the setting of standards and qualifications for those wish-
ing to practice a given profession or occupation. 20 And it is in one of these lat-
ter-type cases that perhaps the best statement of the validity of "special" legis-
lation appears. Upholding a statute prescribing certain hours of work for com-
mercial cleaning establishments (plus other regulations as to the condition of
premises and equipment), the Supreme Court said:
But neither the amendment [the Fourteenth Amendment]-broad and compre-
hensive as it is-nor any other amendment, was designed to interfere with the
power of the State, sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people ...
Regulations for these purposes may press with more or less weight upon one than
upon another, but they are designed, not to impose unequal or unnecessary re-
strictions upon anyone, but to promote, with as little inconvenience as possible,
the general good. Though, in many respects, necessarily special in their character,
they do not furnish just ground of complaint if they operate alike upon all per-
sons and property under the same circumstances and conditions.21
The test evolved by the Court was one of reasonableness-Was there a reason-
able relation between the harm to be prevented and the classes singled out for
special treatment? If so, there was no constitutional violation; if not, the
Fourteenth Amendment demanded treatment equal to that accorded all other
citizens.
sional debates and the public statements of the members of Congress most active in support
of or opposition to the Amendment agrees with the Court's conclusions, both as to the basic
purpose of the Amendment and the absence of specific reference to its application to educa-
tion.
Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949).
0 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
11ld. at 31.
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The early race cases fit easily into this pattern. There was obvious classifica-
tion, a line drawn between black and white for various purposes.2 2 Suscep-
tible to the traditional challenge of unreasonableness, these classifications,
nevertheless, were not invalidated because the Court found them unreason-
able. Rather, they were struck down because of their very nature, as discrimi-
nations on the basis of race, regardless of any arguments on behalf of the
states that they were reasonable. 23 This judicial behavior has been explained
as illustrating the existence of a class of criteria which a state is forbidden to
use for classification purposes.24 The condition of being black or white is what
Mr. Justice Jackson would have called "constitutionally an irrelevance", 25 like
poverty or religious belief or social status. No government can make legal dis-
tinctions among its citizens on these bases. In the case of race, this principle
gains added weight when one remembers that the very purpose of the post-
Civil War amendments was to abolish any legal distinctions between black and
white.
To recapitulate a bit, "equal protection of the laws" was not held to require
absolute equality among citizens. For purposes of regulation, certain classes
of citizens suffered greater restraints than others, and these impositions were
upheld if reasonably related to the evils sought to be avoided. Racial distinc-
tions, however, were invalid per se. Moreover, when legislation was found to
have been prompted solely by prejudice against a group, the existence of this
bias was enough to invoke the "equal protection" clause to upset the classifi-
cation.26 Coming down to the present, the conclusion seems inevitable that
none of these lines of reasoning can support constitutional nullification of an
honestly arrived-at and conscientiously administered neighborhood school
policy.
The classification of citizens which calls into play the "equal protection"
clause is not obvious in the "de facto" segregation cases. By definition, there is
no statutorily commanded distinction between black and white; both races
are compelled to follow the neighborhood school policy. The only classifica-
tion is into residential areas; those living in one area attending one school,
and those in a different section attending another, closer to their homes.
Taking into account the considerations of safety and convenience which sup-
port such an arrangement, it is difficult to find such classification anything but
eminently reasonable. Therefore, the challenge of unreasonableness can be
2 E.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, supra note 14 (jury selection) ; Plessy v. Ferguson, supra
note 15 (railway accomodations) ; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (ownership of
property).
I Buchanan v. Warley, Ibid.
21 Tussman and tenBroek, supra note 19, at 353-56.25Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160,184 (1941) (concurring opinion).
2E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). This
ground has not been used in the cases involving segregation of whites and Negroes.
1964]
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overcome. Moreover, since there is no separation on the basis of race, there can
be no per se invalidation of the arrangement; so, the test of reasonableness is
the only one which can be applied.27
Indeed, here is the crux of the issue. Though one can find isolated phrases
in some of the judicial opinions in this area appearing to support an argu-
ment that, given inequality resulting from some form of state action, that ac-
tion is unconstitutional, a realistic consideration of the facts giving rise to
these decisions should prevent such indiscriminate use of those phrases. There
is not a case among those usually cited in support of this argument where a
distinction solely in terms of race was not at issue.28 Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion29 was nothing more than a continuation of that trend, and, thus, is no
precedent for the "de facto" cases now beginning to plague the courts. Even
in Shelley v. Kraemer3o, where the state itself made no distinction on the basis
of color, Mr. Chief Justice Vinson felt it necessary to state:
The restrictions of these agreements [the racial restrictive covenants] . . . are
directed toward a designated class of persons and seek to determine who may and
who may not own or make use of the properties for residential purposes. The ex-
cluded class is defined wholly in terms of race or color; 'simply that and nothing
more.'
3 1
Indeed, even the analogy with the reapportionment controversy breaks
down. Where the shift of population from country to city has resulted in in-
ordinate weighting of rural votes, the whole reason behind the original dis-
tricting is destroyed, and new districts are demanded. In the school cases, how-
ever, despite the racial shifts of population, use of the neighborhood school
policy continues to foster the same values of safety and convenience as were
aimed at originally. In short, it remains the most reasonable and economical
way to run a large school system.
III
In the preceding parts of this comment, focus has been on the legal arguments
for and against judging the neighborhood school policy unconstitutional
when applied to racially segregated neighborhoods. Is that all there is to it?
Of course, it is not. Courts are well aware of the practical difficulties faced by
school administrators, difficulties of finance and operation which would be
1 As has been emphasized throughout, this comment is not concerned with those situations
in which prior prejudice of the school board is present. Some civil rights advocates have
claimed that such bias has been universal. E.g., Washington Post, Feb. 9, 1964, p. El. Since
this is a question of fact, however, difficult to prove, their efforts have been directed toward
finding a legal theory which would require invalidation even without such a finding.
Cases cited note 22 supra.
Supra note 1.
80 Supra note 12.
m' Id. at 10.
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immeasurably increased by adopting some of the more extreme "solutions"
for the school segregation problem.3 2 Moreover, at least one court has taken
evidence on and given explicit consideration to the effect of integration plans
on the temper of the community 33 , and it is difficult to think any court is un-
aware of the emotions generated among the citizens. So, they do not consider
these cases in a vacuum. But it would be wrong to say that, therefore, their de-
cisions are or must be based on these community reactions. That they have
not been is shown by the invocation of rather severe remedies in cases where
a prior pattern of discrimination has been found. It is doubtful that the prac-
tical problems of the administrators or the reactions of the citizens were any
less intense, yet, having found a constitutional violation, the courts took steps
to remedy it. 84
That community reaction cannot be the basis of judicial resolution of these
questions is shown by the availability of a number of steps to mitigate the evil
effects of separation of the races. A decision that practicality demands reten-
tion of the neighborhood school policy does not indicate general approval of
the system as it presently works. Nor does it immunize the school board from
all court orders to take whatever steps are available in its particular school dis-
trict to relieve the inequality. Whether it be the adoption of the "Princeton
Plan" in fringe areas3 5, or moderate bussing of children from overcrowded
ghetto schools to nearby, under-used "white" schools or a more permissive
transfer policy, there is no reason why school boards cannot be compelled, on
constitutional grounds, to make the greatest efforts, consonant with adminis-
trative and financial realities, to accord the Negro child the same opportunity
as the white child for the personal advancement and enrichment which spring
from education.3 6 This kind of thinking best explains the district court's de-
cision in Branche v. Hempstead.37 The school board made the argument that
not the board but the pattern of residential segregation was responsible for
what school segregation existed. In denying the motion for summary judg-
IThe district court in Bell v. School City of Gary, Ind., supra note 6, gave much explicit
consideration to the practical problems faced by the defendant-school board. The circuit
court referred to testimony that, under a plan submitted by the plaintiffs in that case, 6000
pupils would have to be transported by bus every day, the cost of operation of one bus
amounting to twenty dollars per day. Supra note 6, at 212. The New York City School Board
has estimated that any truly effective plan for integrating its schools would add 88 cents per
day per pupil to its operating costs. America, Feb. 1, 1964, p. 161.
"Evans v. Buchanan, 172 F. Supp. 508 (D.Del. 1958).
81E.g., Taylor v. Board of Education, supra note 4. Even more illustrative are the original
desegregation cases in the South.
"The "Princeton Plan" involves the drawing of school boundaries in fringe areas, where
white neighborhoods meet Negro neighborhoods, so that all children, regardless of race, at-
tend one school from grade one to grade four, and all in grades five thru eight attend the
other school in the area. It is of relatively little use in the large cities where the Negro ghettos
stretch for miles and miles.
"For a fuller consideration of the available measures, see Sedler, supra note 3, at 263-71.
87 Supra note 7.
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ment founded on this argument, the court ordered a trial on the merits at
which the school board could exonerate itself only by making "a conclusive
demonstration that no circumstantially possible effort can affect a significant
mitigation [of the pattern of segregated education]." 38
Therefore, even accepting the constitutional argument made above, these
cases could go the other way, for the plaintiffs and against the school boards.
Balancing off the Negroes' right to equality of educational opportunity (and,
not to be forgotten, society's real interest in protecting that right) against
what appears to be the most reasonable way to run a large school system does
not demand judgment for the defendant-school boards. It is entirely possible
that, more impressed with the deficiencies caused by racial separation and not
convinced that the steps to equalize opportunity would result in chaos or
wholesale disruption of community life, a court could cast the balance the
other way.
CONCLUSION
In concluding, it should again be emphasized that the ideal place for the prob-
lem of "de facto" segregation to be met and wrestled with is in the conference
rooms of the local school boards or in the legislative halls. How much better
equipped than the courts are these arms of the government to weigh the soci-
ological data and practical difficulties in this area. Nevertheless, a substantial
body of the citizenry is dissatisfied with the performance of these bodies3 9 and
makes constitutional claims which are valid, at least on their face. It is difficult
to see how the courts can legitimately avoid passing on these claims.
When they are examined, however, not only traditional "equal protection"
law but also the original segregation cases themselves provide no precedent
for and, indeed, argue against tagging "unconstitutional" the neighborhood
school policy when applied to segregated neighborhoods. The difficulties of
the school boards, financial and administrative, the limited chances of change
in pupil ratio40, and the general slowdown in the civil rights movement which
'mId. at 153. Research brings to light no subsequent judicial history of this case. It is not
unlikely that some sort of settlement was reached, at least temporarily, between the school
board and the plaintiffs.
11 This dissatisfaction will not be cured by the new civil rights bill which has passed the
House and is being debated in the Senate at the date of this writing. In Title IV, entitled
"Desegregation in Public Education", it is provided that the term, " 'Desegregation', shall not
mean the assignment of students to public schools in order to overcome racial imbalance".
H. R. Res. 7152, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. §401 (b). The result is that those provisions allowing
the Attorney-General to institute suits on behalf of parents protesting school segregation
(§407) and authorizing federal financial aid to local school authorities attempting to solve
the problem of integration (§405) will be inapplicable to situations of "de facto" segrega-
tion.
"0 The district court in Bell pointed out that even the adoption of plaintiffs' plan would
result in leaving two of Gary's eight high schools "segregated", one 100% Negro and the
other more than 74% white. Supra note 6, at 831.
[Vol. XIII
Comments
would be caused by community resentment of orders to integrate coming from
the federal courthouse-these considerations, too, urge reluctance to apply
a questionable contitutional standard. It is futile to hope that the courts will
be left to decide these cases free from the pressures, legitimate and illegitimate,
exerted by both dominant and minority races. Advocates on both sides are not
ready to allow that. The greatest contribution the courts can make, then, is
to demonstrate their ability to come to a reasoned reconciliation of the op-
posing interests, and to make it stick. Is it too much to hope that, in so doing,
they might induce a similar effort on the part of the contesting parties them-
selves? Is it not likely that the advocates on both sides, if made to realize that
the courts will not accede to their pressures, will adopt a more reasonable at-
titude when they meet to argue the issues among themselves? Such an attitude
has been sadly lacking on both sides for too long a time, and without it, the
judgments of courts can do little to ease the real conflict, and there is little
hope for lasting progress.
JOSEPH M. SHORTALL
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